I think Edinburgh closes were traditionally closed, at least in the better class of buildings, with multiple bell-pulls at the front door and a rod mechanism for opening the door from upper flats. Glasgow were traditionally open.
I have lived in closes which still had the remains of gas lighting points in the close.
In message , at 20:50:21 on Sat, 1 Jul 2017, bert remarked:
Quite a few I expect. The London Fire Brigade say they attend two tower block fires a day, and there have been previous reports of dodgy brands of fridge[/freezer]. It'd be strange indeed if a fridge hadn't been the source of a fire in a tower block before.
Ah yes...
"Six fire engines and 35 fire fighters tackled a fire caused by a fridge at a high rise block"
and earlier in 2011:
"Beko fridge-freezers manufactured between January 2000 and October 2006 are at the centre of the safety warning, and it is thought as many as
500,000 could be in use. London Fire Brigade say there have been 20 fires in the capital alone involving the fridge freezers since 2008, which have seen one person die and 15 people injured."
The plot thickens. Today it is reported that tenants of neighbouring properties are having their rent suspended because they don't have hot water, the central plant having been destroyed in the Grenfell fire.
17:02:42 on Sun, 2 Jul 2017, "dennis@home" remarked:
The core wasn't designed to stop fire arriving through the windows on almost all flats on all floors simultaneously. That's a problem with the cladding.
If you have an erroneous preconception about the truth, then you are doomed to think that.
If a flat was on fire you should have been safe to move into the core and then go down the stairs and escape. It shouldn't matter that other flats were on fire.
A proper enquiry will find out why the core failed and so many couldn't get out. The cladding is a side issue and may well be hiding the real issues.
It doesn't really matter if a block of flats burns down if everyone can get out and that is the real issue.
Who is looking at what really killed the people while everyone is going on about the cladding?
Yes I can see why that is true.
This is the same issue as the twin towers, many people died because the core was a crap design and they were trapped. The planes didn't immediately destroy the buildings but they did destroy the poorly built stairs. The lifts were inside a structural concrete tube but the stairs were outside that and only protected by plasterboard.
19:16:25 on Sun, 2 Jul 2017, "dennis@home" remarked:
People were told (in both the short and long term) to stay inside their flats and await rescue. But that only works if most of the flats aren't also on fire from the outside in.
A deadly combination of non-fireproof cladding plus PIR insulation that was assumed to be fire-resistant (but wasn't because the temperature exceeded its limitations) plus poor detailed installation (vertical 'tunnels' at each corner and along the sides) plus tenants who may have interfered with the fire door entrances to their flat, plus possibly the ones in communal spaces, all contributed to the inferno by setting the inside of the building alight too.
I suspect that if rockwool insulation had been used, and all internal fire doors were working, then the fire would have been dramatic from outside but stayed on the outside.
That may be why the core failed but it probably isn't how the fire spread. It might be how the smoke spread and made escape impossible.
There are cases of tenants replacing fire doors with PVC doors with zero fire resistance but I have no idea if this had been done. A proper investigation is needed not just lets blame it on the cladding.
Not a chance, the radiant heat would set fire to curtains and stuff like that even if the windows remained intact and closed.
The internal fire doors should have kept the core clear of fire and most of the smoke. That's what they are there for.
That means pretty well every tower block is a deathtrap, then.
To my thinking, it's likely to be the modernisation that made it so dangerous. Basically, for whatever reason, the escape route became unusable too quickly.
Yes, for a fire in one flat. The building emergency stairwell and smoke venting system was designed to cope with a fire isolated to a single flat with a self-closing fire door. It wasn't designed to cope with multiple simultaneous fires, which was a direct cause of the cladding used.
Odd how incidents like this bring out the armchair expert/pub bore mentality.
On radio this morning, discussion that building regs vs local byelaws are so complex/conflicting that some fire officers would consider firedoors part of an inspection, others would consider them something to be *avoided* during an inspection.
21:56:25 on Sun, 2 Jul 2017, "dennis@home" remarked:
That is perhaps where the mixed messages cause a problem.
No doubt the enquiry will determine why the stairwell filled with smoke, but it wouldn't have taken very many doors from interior landings being propped open by debris[1] to fill it with smoke - once again it will have been designed for just one landing to have been on fire, not almost all of them simultaneously.
[1] There is one report circulating that a much earlier fire leaked smoke because the fire brigade's hoses had to breach those fire doors in order to extinguish a blaze in a flat.
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