Notice it wasn't denied. :-)
K & C council has been Tory controlled for 50 years. When someone is apparently jumping to their defence over something like this one tends to get a pretty good view of their interests.
But carry on having your fantasies.
Your full sentence was in the text I left at the start of my post.
The words I quoted back at you were the substance of your statement on which I wanted to know how you justified them given:
a. there are many safety critical features which can be buggered up by poor installation. That doesn't make them "dodgy". Or would you say that concrete lintels marked "top" are "a very obviously dodgy method" of supporting a wall if a householder was killed because such a lintel was installed the wrong way up?
b. others, with some qualification in fire investigation, have stated on air there could be other explanations.
And for your question, I have made no statements about what was and was not the cause of the fire. I think you must be confusing me with someone who is wont to make categorical statements without offering any supporting evidence, and swivels when presented with evidence to prove them false.
There is a big difference between what a motor costs and what a building costs as whomever is at fault is going to find out.
What visible evidence are you claiming existed at the time of installation? Surely the metal skin and AAA fire rating would both be convincing to most people - in fact we know they were.
NT
Ah the expertise of this typical uk.d-i-y-er shines through again - an example to us all. Not just how to nail pieces of wood together, but how to construct tall buildings without fire risk.
In the same way govt buildings are self-insured, on the grounds that taxpayers will cover any losses.
Maybe in order to avoid jumping to conclusions? Although as described in the report on the events of 9/11, enquiries often get their conclusions wrong, as shown in reports from Perl Harbour to the JKK assassination.
well its nice to know that half the MSM are running with the ideas posted up here yesterday.
etc...
it seems that what there was in fact was celotex slapped on, then an airgap then alloy skinned polystyrene decorative panels to hide the celotex.
But the Lilly Allens and Cerys Matthews of this world are now popping up in front of cameras demanding sprinklers in every high rise, without any evidence whether they would have made much of a difference in this case.
No one gives a f*ck about what started it.
It is why its spread and engulfed the whole building.
That is not meant to happen.
Its icelandic banks all over again.
that cladding has been implicated in more than one serious fire.
Its not clear it was even A rated. Al coated stryrene is cheap and its light and it looks good and it burns like f*ck.
Which part of 'method' needs explaining to you?
Yes. A method is a way of doing something - a technique. If that method includes installing something in the wrong way it is dodgy.
Right. Perfectly acceptable for cladding to go up like that? Obviously we don't yet know the exact cause of it doing so, but it's rather obvious someone somewhere f***ed up. Given the maker of the cladding has two alternatives - both with better fire resistance - but more expensive, it would seem likely costs were put before safety. Especially as this cladding is banned in the US for properties over IIRC 40ft in height.
Certain things are so obvious you don't need to sound like a politician wriggling out of a responsibility.
Apparently this exact product is banned in the US for buildings of this height. The same maker has similar but with better fire resistance.
A Fire Safety Inspection only checks that appropiate mitigation measures are in place acording to the risk assement that is the responsibilty of the building management. They check the risk assesment as well but they aren't going to go ripping off cladding to check that the materials used, installation methods etc match what the tick boxes say.
En el artículo , Martin Brown escribió:
The void is clearly seen in this pic.
En el artículo , bm escribió:
Martin's pointing out that the void acts like a chimney. It channels the fire up the building behind the cladding, allowing it to climb the structure quickly. Apparently there should have been firebreaks in the voids to prevent this, and one aspect of the investigation is whether they were fitted or not, although the plans specified them.
it now seems that it would have cost little extra (£5k ish) to fit the fire-resistant FR panels instead of the flammable PE (polyethylene) ones used, so yes, looks like corners were cut.
think you can say that about pretty much anything.
The times and indy seem to be stating that it was the PE (no fire rating) rather than FR (fire resistant) version that was fitted, and it would only have cost £5k extra for the whole tower to fit the fire resistant version
They also make an A2 (incombustible) version.
both the PE and FR versions seem to be approved by the BBA certificate, while most other (EN or DIN) certifications only approve the FR or A2 versions.
Meanwhile the BBC is still confusing the insulation and the cladding.
well the insulation is also a cladding
Disagree. We are told it was an exploding fridge, we need to know more about the appliance and if the failure mode is likely to become common. An electric motor running in butane? I wouldn't knowingly buy it.
Looks like sales are going to drop like a stone. Re engineer instantly!
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