OT: What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 Max?

[Mike Oxbern]

Malfunctions caused two deadly crashes. But an industry that puts unprepared pilots in the cockpit is just as guilty.

[trader_4]

I agree. Especially with regard to the first crash, Lion Air. They flew around for about 8 mins, unable to deal with what was a runaway trim condition, an emergency where the procedure is supposed to be a memory item.

[Bob F]

Blaming the pilots when the capitalist corporate structure was the real problem.

[Mike Oxbern]

LOL! Good grief, Bob! If the Wright brothers had been socialists, they'd still be waiting for the government to build an airplane for them.

[Roger Blake]

Socialist morons are always quick to blame private enterprise for all of life's ills while ignoring the millions of deaths that their Lord and Saviour (government) is responsible for.

[trader_4]

The problem manifested itself as a runaway trim condition, which all pilots are trained to deal with as an emergency. They are supposed to have the procedure committed to memory. Yet the Lion Air crash, the pilots flew around for around 7 mins, constantly fighting the plane, instead of correctly identifying it as a runaway trim and using the two cut-off switches provided, then trimming manually. The previous flight, same thing happened and again, the two pilots flying it apparently couldn't follow their basic flight training. Fortunately another pilot was in the cockpit in the jump seat and he told them what to do. Not only did it not crash, it flew on to it's destination. Did Boeing screw up in the design? Absolutely. Did the FAA (a govt agency) screw up in certifying it? Absolutely. Did many of the pilots screw up? Absolutely.

[gfretwell]

The experienced pilots who actually read the Boeing notices to airmen after the first crash knew they could bypass the MCAS by simply dialing in a little flap, then fly to their destination or a convenient alternate airport, land the plane normally and have a beer. The first crash may have been a surprise but the second one was simply people not reading the available literature.

[micky]

Actually, I don't think Mike blamed the pilots but an industry that put unprepared pilots into the cokcput.

But Mike, instead of giving my answer, above, you give this unrelated ridiculous answer.

So because you don't like socialism, which Bob F didn't even mention, you imply there is nothing wrong with the corportate structure of Boeing? When you just criticized the industry. Are you so combative you can't keep track of which side you're on?

Can't you imagine that socialism is not as good as capitalism but there is still something fouled up at Boeing and many other "corporate structures".

Is everything all or nothing according to you?

[trader_4]

You;d have to look at the whole system, the training, but a whole lot of the blame is with the pilots. That first Lion Air crash was like a driver fighting with the malfunctioning automatic steering on one of the new cars, instead of turning it off. And turning it off has always been part of the most basic flight training for all pilots. It's also very obvious if you understand how planes fly and what the switches right at your side are for. The flight right before was not good either, the two pilots flying didn't know what to do, the one that just happened to be riding in the jump seat did. Ethiopia is less clear. They had very little time to figure it out. But on the other hand, they had knowledge of, or should have had knowledge of what happened in the Lion Air crash, the new directive put out, etc.

[gfretwell]

Boeing put the information out after the first crash that would have prevented the second one if the pilots had simply read and understood it. Again, all they needed to do to shut down MCAS was add in a little flap. In the discussion on AvWeb some US pilots with far more 737 hours than most pointed that out.

[trader_4]

I agree. But even in the first crash, they had the symptoms of runaway electric trim. That can happen even without MCAS due to a short, stuck switch, etc. It's where the electric trim isn't doing what the pilots want it do do, it's acting on it's own. That is part of all pilot training. It's also very obvious, because the trim wheels are spinning right at their side, with the indicators showing *something* is forcing nose down trim. Whether that's a short or MCAS really doesn't matter. The procedure is to turn off the electric trim, using the two switches that have been in all 737s and all planes AFAIK with electric trim forever. And then trim manually. The problem is that trimming manually can be either very difficult or impossible. But it obviously worked in the flight just previous on Lion Air. And with the LA pilots flying around for 7 mins, it almost certainly would have worked, the plane was not totally out of control.

With the Ethiopian Air flight, they only had a couple mins to sort it out at most, for them what would have worked would have been what you just said, apply flaps again. In fact, with all these flights, it's kind of amazing that when the big trouble started as soon as the flaps were retracted that no one thought to try that. Like, the plane was fine until we just took flaps off, let's try going back to the first flap setting.

Another thing Boeing is now looking into is how many different alarms and warnings go off at the same time. It looks like pilots get overwhelmed with horns, stick shaker, warning lights, voice alerts, etc. Looks like they are thinking about less warnings, but then that probably isn't without consequences either.

[gfretwell]

Old pilots have been pointing out for years, actually flying a plane is a skill that is not really being learned by today's pilots that rely too heavily on computerized flight controls. It is sort of like a kid at Wendy's when the register is down and they have to make change. It isn't pretty.

[micky]

That might be. I don't know one way or the other.

But it doesn't change my point that Bob F blamed Mike for something he did not say.

[gfretwell]

Sully (The guy who dead sticked an Airbus into the Hudson with no loss of life) weighed in on the Ethiopia crash and pointed out the FO on Ethiopian Airlines Flight 602 lacked the experience to play a meaningful role in dealing with the in-flight emergency. The FO is reported to have had only 200 hours of total flight time, a level of experience Sullenberger called “absurdly low” for someone with responsibility for the safety of an airliner full of people. He said “A cockpit crew must be a team of experts, not a captain and an apprentice”.

[trader_4]

Only problem with that is that the voice recorder shows that it was the co-pilot who correctly identified the runaway trim problem and tried to correct it. No indication the pilot had any clue. The co-pilot turned off the electric trim and was trying to trim it manually and he said he could not do it. Which lead to discussion that once the plane is trimmed too hard and going fast enough, it may take both pilots to turn the wheels or it may be impossible even with both of them. There was also discussion that decades ago the Boeing manuals reflected that, with advice that if the plane was trimmed too hard nose down, to put the plane into a steep dive, to lessen the pressure so you could then turn the wheels. At 20,000 ft AGL that;s an option. On takeoff at a few thousand feet, no so much.

What would have worked, would have been either;

Your procedure of applying flaps, which would have disabled MCAS and allowed them to trim back using the buttons

or

Using the electric trim buttons to first get the trim back to near where it should be and only then turning off the switches and trimming manually.

The first, you would think they should have understood following the first crash and directives that came from it. They were flying the same plane, with the same gear, that had caused the previous crash.

The second you would think they would both know from very basic flight training, flight principles, how the control surfaces and forces work.

But they didn't. Neither did the 4 Lion Air pilots, the two who crashed and the two who were in the same plane the flight just before. The pilot in the jump seat saved their bacon.

[gfretwell]

All indications are that JFK Jr did not believe what his instruments were telling him, had no VFR horizon and simply flew the plane into the water. It is not like he hit a mountain or anything. His crash occurred at zero feet ASL. It was also significant that although he had a very sophisticated plane, he was not licensed to use those electronics and had no business being on an IFR flight with VFR credentials. Like the 2 guys killed on PT 109, he died over Kennedy arrogance.

[devnull]

Night flying has its own set of challenges.

Very early in my training and on my first night flight, instructor put the hood on me and vectored me out over Lake Michigan for some instrument work.  Visibility was about 10 miles with a thick cloud deck around 15,000'.

After about 20 minutes into the flight he says to lift my hood and take a break.  After lifting my hood I immediately shouted "What The Fuck".  It was pitch black out, no horizon, no nothing. Just the old instrument panel 6-pack staring at me.

The lesson learned was if your going to fly at night, get your instrument ticket and stay reasonably proficient...or you'll prolly bore a nice hole in the ground.

[devnull]

That's a nice idea but pushing it would probably end a commercial pilot's career.

[trader_4]

Sure, he became spatially disoriented. The plane had an auto-pilot, there is good reason to believe a simple panic button that would have engaged the auto-pilot to maintain level flight could have prevented the crash.

When he took off, the conditions were VFR in NJ and I believe forecasted consistent with VFR for the entire flight. This happens very frequently, pilots take off in VFR conditions, but wind up in IFR conditions. Again a panic button to keep the plane level and to give him time to sort it out could have saved him and a lot of others.

[Ed Pawlowski]

At the New Jersey shore a lot of guys would follow the coastline for sightseeing. Then they get a weather inversion and suddenly, everything is gray. Of course, being experienced non-instrument rated pilots they knew by feel better than those gauges on the panel. SPLASH